ALLAMA IQBAL OPEN UNIVERSITY

USMAN NOTES
www.usmannotes.com

Name:

Registration No.:

Course Code: 538

Program: BS/MSc

Semester: Autumn 2026

ALLAMA IQBAL OPEN UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

Course: Genesis of Pakistan Movement (9358/538) • Level: BS/MSc

Semester: Autumn 2026

Assignment No. 1 (Units 1–5)

Total Marks: 100

SOLVED ASSIGNMENT GUIDE

(For Study & Reference)

Note: This guide is prepared for study and reference purposes. Students are advised to read the relevant units of the course book, understand the concepts, and write the assignment in their own words.

USMAN NOTES www.usmannotes.com

Question 1: The 1857 Uprising and the Role of the Revolutionaries (20 Marks)

How would you explain the 1857 Uprising? Illustrate your answer with reference to the role of the Revolutionaries.

Introduction

The uprising of 1857 was the first great armed challenge to British rule in India and the most dramatic event of the nineteenth-century subcontinent. It began as a revolt of the sepoys of the Bengal Army at Meerut on 10 May 1857, but within weeks it had spread across northern and central India and drawn in dispossessed princes, landlords, peasants, artisans and religious leaders. Historians have long debated how it should be explained. British writers of the time dismissed it as a mere 'Sepoy Mutiny' caused by greased cartridges. Nationalist historians, most famously V. D. Savarkar in 1909, described it as the 'First War of Indian Independence'. Later scholars such as R. C. Majumdar argued that it was neither purely a mutiny nor a fully planned national war, but a series of connected revolts fed by deep and widespread discontent. The

most balanced explanation is that the uprising was the explosive result of half a century of political annexation, economic exploitation, social interference and military grievance, ignited by a religious spark, and that it was the revolutionaries - the emperors, queens, chiefs, maulvis and common soldiers who led and sustained it - who converted a barrack-room mutiny into a popular rebellion.

Background and Causes of the Uprising

The political causes lay in the aggressive expansion of the East India Company, above all under Lord Dalhousie (1848-1856). His Doctrine of Lapse denied adopted heirs and annexed Satara (1848), Jaitpur and Sambalpur, Jhansi (1853) and Nagpur (1854), while Awadh was annexed outright in 1856 on the charge of misgovernment. The pension of Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the last Peshwa, was stopped, and the Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar was told that his successors would lose the imperial title and palace. Rulers, taluqdars and soldiers drawn from annexed states such as Awadh therefore had personal reasons to hate the Company, and every Indian prince felt insecure.

Economic, social and religious grievances affected the wider population. Heavy land-revenue settlements ruined peasants and dispossessed old landlords; Indian artisans were ruined by machine-made British imports; and orthodox Hindus and Muslims alike feared forcible conversion, pointing to missionary activity, the abolition of sati, widow-remarriage legislation and English education as evidence of a design against their religions. Within the army, sepoys resented low pay, racial arrogance, the loss of allowances, and the General Service Enlistment Act of 1856, which obliged new recruits to serve overseas and so threatened caste. The

immediate spark was the introduction of the new Enfield rifle, whose cartridges - rumoured to be greased with the fat of the cow and the pig - had to be bitten, offending Hindu and Muslim sepoys equally. When Mangal Pandey attacked his officers at Barrackpore on 29 March 1857 and sepoys at Meerut refused the cartridges and were imprisoned, their comrades rose on 10 May, released them, and marched to Delhi.

Course of the Uprising

At Delhi the mutineers proclaimed the aged Bahadur Shah Zafar as Emperor of India, giving the revolt a recognised sovereign and an all-India symbol. From Delhi the fire spread to the great centres of the Gangetic plain and central India: Lucknow and the whole of Awadh, Kanpur, Jhansi and Bundelkhand, Bareilly and Rohilkhand, Faizabad, Allahabad and Arrah in Bihar. In Awadh the rising was a genuinely popular revolt in which taluqdars, peasants and disbanded soldiers of the annexed kingdom fought together. Yet the movement remained confined mainly to northern and central India. The Punjab, recently conquered, was held down and even supplied troops against Delhi; the south remained quiet; Sindh and Bengal, apart from Bihar, were little affected; and most Indian princes - the Nizam, Scindia, the Sikh chiefs and the Gurkhas of Nepal - actively helped the British. Delhi was recaptured in September 1857 after a bitter siege, Lucknow was finally recovered in March 1858, and organised resistance died away during 1858-1859, although guerrilla fighting continued longer in central India.

Role of the Revolutionaries

What distinguishes 1857 from an ordinary military mutiny is the role of the revolutionaries - the civil and military leaders who gave the rising direction, legitimacy and popular breadth. Their contribution can be seen in the work of its outstanding figures.

- Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal emperor, provided the indispensable symbol of legitimacy. Although old and initially reluctant, his name allowed Hindu and Muslim rebels alike to claim they were fighting to restore lawful authority rather than to mutiny. Proclamations were issued in his name across northern India, and in Delhi he took care to respect Hindu sentiment, even prohibiting cow slaughter during Bakr-Id, so preserving the unity of the two communities. Under his general, Bakht Khan, who brought the Bareilly troops to Delhi, the capital held out for four months against the British.
- Begum Hazrat Mahal led the revolution in Awadh. After the British deposed Wajid Ali Shah, she had her young son Birjis Qadr proclaimed Nawab at Lucknow, organised the defence of the city, raised troops and money, administered the recovered state and issued proclamations justifying resistance. Lucknow became the most stubborn centre of the revolt, and even after its fall she continued the struggle from the Nepal terai rather than accept a British pension.
- Nana Sahib, Tantia Tope and Azimullah Khan directed the rising at Kanpur. Nana Sahib, aggrieved by the stoppage of his pension, was proclaimed Peshwa and captured Kanpur. His commander Tantia Tope proved the most brilliant guerrilla leader of the war: after Kanpur fell he carried the struggle into central India, joined the Rani of Jhansi, seized Gwalior in

June 1858 and evaded British columns for almost a year before he was betrayed and executed in April 1859.

- Rani Lakshmibai of Jhansi became the immortal heroine of the uprising. Her state had been annexed under the Doctrine of Lapse, and when the revolt reached Jhansi she took up arms, defended her fort against Sir Hugh Rose, escaped to Kalpi and then to Gwalior, and died fighting in June 1858. Even her enemy Hugh Rose described her as the most dangerous of the rebel leaders, and she showed that the revolution drew women and dispossessed rulers into its leadership.
- Regional and religious leaders rooted the revolt in the countryside. The octogenarian Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur led a remarkable guerrilla campaign in Bihar, defeating British forces around Arrah and dying of his wounds in April 1858. In Rohilkhand, Khan Bahadur Khan set up an independent administration at Bareilly. Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah of Faizabad mobilised popular and religious feeling in Awadh and fought at Lucknow and Shahjahanpur, while scholars such as Maulvi Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi issued calls to jihad against the foreign rulers.
- Above all, the anonymous revolutionaries - sepoys who refused the cartridges, peasants who attacked revenue records and moneylenders, artisans and disbanded soldiers who joined the rebel armies - gave the movement its mass character. Rebel proclamations, such as the Delhi and Azamgarh proclamations, appealed to Hindus and Muslims together, promised relief from heavy taxation and called for the expulsion of the English, which shows the rising had a political programme larger than the grievance of the cartridge.

Why the Uprising Failed

The revolutionaries, however brave, failed for structural reasons. They had no central organisation, no common plan and no single commander; each leader fought for his own locality or grievance - the restoration of a throne, a pension or a state - rather than for an agreed national objective. The rising was geographically limited, its weapons were inferior, and it lacked money, artillery and communications. The British, by contrast, could use the telegraph, draw reinforcements by sea after the Crimean War, and rely on loyal princes and on Punjabi, Sikh and Gurkha troops. The educated middle classes, the product of English education, largely stood aloof or supported the government. Personal courage could not compensate for the absence of unity, resources and a modern political programme.

Consequences and Significance

The suppression of the uprising was savage: Delhi was sacked, thousands were executed, and Bahadur Shah Zafar was tried and exiled to Rangoon, where he died in 1862, ending the Mughal dynasty. Constitutionally, the Government of India Act of 1858 abolished the rule of the East India Company and transferred India to the Crown; Queen Victoria's Proclamation of November 1858 promised non-interference in religion, an end to annexation and equal treatment of subjects. The army was reorganised with a higher proportion of Europeans, artillery kept in European hands, and recruitment shifted towards Punjab and the so-called martial races. Politically, the British initially blamed the Muslims as the chief conspirators: Muslims were expelled from Delhi, their property was confiscated and they were excluded from favour, a reaction analysed by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in his Causes of the Indian Revolt (1858). The racial bitterness left by 1857 widened the gulf between rulers and ruled permanently.

Yet the significance of the uprising is greater than its failure. It demonstrated that Indians of different religions and regions could unite in arms against foreign rule, and it destroyed forever the British illusion that their empire rested on Indian consent. Its heroes - the Rani of Jhansi, Tantia Tope, Kunwar Singh and the martyrs of Delhi - became part of the freedom movement's memory and inspiration for later generations, including the revolutionaries of the twentieth century and the soldiers of the Indian National Army. For the Muslims of India, the disaster of 1857 also opened a period of painful rethinking about education, politics and survival that shaped everything from the Aligarh movement to the eventual demand for Pakistan.

Conclusion

To conclude, the 1857 uprising is best explained as a general rebellion produced by fifty years of annexation, exploitation and interference, sparked by the greased cartridges, rather than as either a simple mutiny or a fully organised national war. The revolutionaries - Bahadur Shah Zafar as its symbol, Begum Hazrat Mahal, Nana Sahib, Tantia Tope, Rani Lakshmibai, Kunwar Singh, Maulvi Ahmadullah Shah and thousands of unnamed sepoys and peasants - transformed scattered mutinies into a popular uprising stretching from Delhi to Bihar. They failed because they lacked unity, organisation and resources, but their sacrifice ended Company rule, changed the character of the British Raj, and lit the first flame of the subcontinent's struggle for freedom.

Question 2: The Partition of Bengal, 1905, and the Muslim Interest (20 Marks)

Discuss the partition of Bengal of 1905. How did it suit the Muslim interest.

Introduction

The partition of Bengal, announced by the Viceroy Lord Curzon in July 1905 and carried into effect on 16 October 1905, was one of the most consequential administrative decisions of British India. It divided the unwieldy province of Bengal and created a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, with its capital at Dacca, in which Muslims formed a majority of the population. The Congress and the Hindu leadership of Bengal denounced the measure as an attack on Bengali nationalism and launched the Swadeshi movement against it, but the Muslims of eastern Bengal welcomed the partition, supported it under the leadership of Nawab Salimullah of Dacca, and drew from it political lessons that led directly to the Simla Deputation of 1906 and the founding of the All-India Muslim League. To understand the partition, its stated administrative logic, its political motives and its benefits for the Muslims must all be examined.

Bengal Before Partition

Bengal in 1901 was by far the largest province of British India, covering some 189,000 square miles with a population of about 78.5 million - larger than many European empires. A single Lieutenant-Governor at Calcutta had to administer not only the Bengali-speaking districts but also Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur, while Assam had been separated in 1874 as a small Chief Commissionership. The administrative case for division was real. The eastern districts - Dacca, Mymensingh, Chittagong, Rajshahi and the great river deltas - were notoriously neglected: they

were far from Calcutta, poorly served by police and courts, infested in places by river dacoity, and their trade was strangled because Assam had no proper outlet to the sea except through Calcutta. Successive officials had proposed reducing Bengal's size since the 1860s, and Curzon took up the question soon after his arrival, touring eastern Bengal in 1904 and promising its people development under a nearer government.

The Partition Scheme of 1905

The final scheme, announced on 19 July 1905 and implemented on 16 October 1905, transferred the Dacca, Chittagong and Rajshahi divisions, together with Malda district and the state of Hill Tippera, from Bengal and joined them with Assam to form the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam under a Lieutenant-Governor at Dacca. The reduced province of Bengal retained western Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, with Calcutta remaining both its capital and the capital of India. The contrast between the two provinces explains most of the politics that followed.

Table 1: The two provinces created by the partition of Bengal, 1905

Feature	Eastern Bengal and Assam	Bengal (as reduced in 1905)
Capital	Dacca	Calcutta
Population (approx.)	31 million (including Assam)	54 million
Religious composition	Muslim majority - about 18 million Muslims to 12 million Hindus	Hindu majority overall, but Bengali-speakers a minority beside Hindi- and Oriya-speakers
Territory	Eastern Bengal districts plus Assam	Western Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur
Head of government	Lieutenant-Governor at Dacca	Lieutenant-Governor at Calcutta

For the first time since the Mughal period, the Muslims of eastern Bengal - overwhelmingly poor peasants cultivating jute and rice under largely Hindu zamindars, moneylenders and lawyers - found themselves the majority community of a province with its own government seated in their own historic city of Dacca.

Motives: Administrative Reform or Divide and Rule?

Officially, the government defended the partition as a purely administrative measure designed to improve the governance of an overgrown province, develop the neglected east and give Assam the port of Chittagong and a viable administration. There was substance in this argument, and many officials genuinely believed it. However, the political motive is also documented. H. H. Risley, the Home Secretary, minuted in 1904 that 'Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided will pull in several different ways', and that one of the scheme's merits was to split the Bengali-speaking politicians who dominated Congress agitation. Curzon himself told audiences in eastern Bengal that the new province would invest the Muslims with a unity they had not enjoyed since the days of the Mughal viceroys - a clear appeal to Muslim support as a counterweight to the Congress. The honest conclusion is that the partition combined a genuine administrative case with a deliberate political calculation: the British wished simultaneously to govern Bengal better and to weaken the Congress by cultivating Muslim loyalty. It is this second motive that Hindu critics labelled 'divide and rule'.

The Hindu Reaction and the Swadeshi Movement

Hindu Bengal reacted with fury. The bhadralok - the educated, largely Hindu professional and landholding class of Calcutta - saw the partition as the vivisection of the Bengali motherland

and a blow to their dominance of the professions and politics of the whole province. Congress declared a boycott of British goods, and the Swadeshi movement promoted Indian manufactures, national schools and passive resistance; 16 October 1905 was observed as a day of mourning, with Rabindranath Tagore proposing the tying of rakhis as a symbol of Bengal's unity. The agitation, which also gave birth to revolutionary terrorism in Bengal, continued until the partition was annulled in 1911. The intensity of this reaction itself reveals why the Muslims supported the partition: the interests advanced by Calcutta's leadership were not the interests of the Muslim peasantry of the east.

How the Partition Suited the Muslim Interest

The partition suited the Muslim interest in at least five concrete ways, and it is these that the question requires us to discuss in detail.

- A Muslim-majority province. In undivided Bengal the Muslims, though roughly half the population of the Bengali districts, were politically drowned in a province run from Calcutta by a Hindu professional elite. In Eastern Bengal and Assam they were a clear majority, able for the first time to influence legislation, municipal bodies and district boards in proportion to their numbers, and to see their language, education and religious concerns treated as the concerns of a governing community rather than of a tolerated minority.
- Development of Dacca and the east. The new government at Dacca invested in the neglected eastern districts: roads, railways, courts, colleges and offices came nearer to the people, Dacca grew rapidly as a provincial capital, trade through Chittagong expanded, and schemes such as a university at Dacca (promised after the annulment as compensation and

finally established in 1921) entered practical politics. The Muslim peasantry expected, and partly received, relief from the indifference of a distant Calcutta administration.

- Economic relief and opportunity. Eastern Bengal's Muslims were mostly tenants and jute-growers indebted to Hindu zamindars and mahajans and excluded from government service by their educational backwardness. A separate province promised more Muslim appointments in the police, judiciary and secretariat, new courts closer to the cultivator, and a government sympathetic to tenancy grievances. Even modest recruitment of Muslims into services was a real material gain for a community that had fallen far behind since 1857.
- Political awakening and organisation. Defence of the partition obliged Bengali Muslims to organise politically for the first time. Nawab Salimullah of Dacca emerged as their leader, presiding over meetings and conferences that supported the new province. The experience, and the fear that Hindu agitation might reverse the partition, convinced Muslim leaders all over India that they needed their own political platform: it led to the Simla Deputation of October 1906, which won the promise of separate electorates, and to the founding of the All-India Muslim League at Dacca itself on 30 December 1906 - the party that forty years later created Pakistan.
- A counterweight in all-India politics. So long as Bengal remained united, Congress could claim to speak for its 78 million people, and Muslim claims were submerged. A Muslim-majority province gave India's Muslims demographic and institutional weight: a government, a legislative council and a capital of their own, demonstrating that Muslim political identity could be organised territorially - an idea that runs in a direct line from 1905 to the Lahore Resolution of 1940.

It must be added, in fairness, that not every Muslim supported the partition. A small group of Congress Muslims in Bengal opposed it, and the benefits of the six years 1905-1911 were only beginnings: educational and service gains take a generation to mature. Nor did the partition solve the agrarian problem of the Muslim tenant under the Hindu zamindar. But the direction of advantage was unmistakable, which is precisely why its annulment in 1911 was received by Muslims as a catastrophe, and why the episode taught them that concessions granted by the British could be withdrawn under pressure unless Muslims possessed the organised strength to defend them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the partition of Bengal of 1905 was an administrative reform that the British also intended as a political counterweight to Congress, but whatever its motives, it objectively suited the Muslim interest: it created a Muslim-majority province, brought government and development to Dacca and the east, opened services and education to a backward community, and awakened Indian Muslims to political organisation. The Swadeshi agitation against it and the partition's annulment six years later only deepened the lesson. Few episodes better deserve the description of a turning point in the genesis of the Pakistan movement.

Question 3: Muslim Reaction to the Annulment of the Partition of Bengal (20 Marks)

How did the Muslims react to the annulment of the partition of Bengal? Discuss.

Introduction

On 12 December 1911, at the great Delhi Durbar held in his honour, King-Emperor George V personally announced that the partition of Bengal was annulled. The Bengali-speaking districts were reunited in a single province, Bihar and Orissa were made a separate province, Assam reverted to a Chief Commissionership, and - as a companion announcement - the capital of India was transferred from Calcutta to Delhi. For the Hindu leadership of Bengal, which had agitated against the partition for six years through the Swadeshi movement, boycott and revolutionary violence, this was a triumph. For the Muslims of India, who had supported the partition, benefited from the Muslim-majority province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and repeatedly been assured that the partition was a 'settled fact' which could not be reopened, it was a stunning blow. The reaction - shock, a sense of betrayal, the collapse of faith in British assurances and a permanent change in Muslim political strategy - is a landmark in the genesis of the Pakistan movement.

The Annulment and the Broken Assurance of a Settled Fact

The bitterness of the Muslim reaction cannot be understood without the assurances that preceded it. When the partition was carried out in 1905, the government had declared it a settled fact, and officials repeatedly told Muslim delegations that no amount of agitation would reverse it. It was on the faith of this assurance that Nawab Salimullah and the Muslims of eastern Bengal had invested their political capital in the new province, accepted Hindu hostility as its price, and defended the settlement at the Simla Deputation and in the founding of the Muslim League. The annulment was secretly decided in London and Delhi and sprung upon India without consulting a single Muslim leader. Even the transfer of the capital to Delhi -

historically a Muslim city, and presented as a gesture towards Muslim sentiment - could not disguise the fact that the one substantial concession Muslims had received in half a century had been withdrawn because their opponents had agitated, boycotted and, in the revolutionary societies, killed for its withdrawal.

Immediate Reaction: Shock, Grief and a Sense of Betrayal

The first Muslim reaction was simple disbelief, followed by grief and anger. Meetings of protest were held across eastern Bengal and in the Muslim press of the whole of India. Papers such as The Comrade, edited by Maulana Muhammad Ali, and The Mussalman of Calcutta expressed anguish and warned that Muslim confidence in British justice had been destroyed at a stroke. Nawab Salimullah, whose health and prestige were both committed to the new province, was heartbroken; he withdrew largely from active politics, and his leadership of Bengali Muslims never recovered. The Aga Khan and other loyalist leaders could only counsel patience, and their counsels sounded hollow. The government offered eastern Bengal a consolation in the promise of a university at Dacca, announced in 1912 - a genuine benefit, but one that underlined the loss, since the university had become necessary precisely because Dacca had ceased to be a capital. Ordinary Muslims of the eastern districts feared the return of Calcutta's dominance, the slowing of development at Dacca, and the loss of the services and recognition the new province had begun to give them.

Underlying the grief was a sharper political emotion: humiliation. Muslims felt that they had been used. They had supported the government loyally, resisted Congress blandishments and borne the social boycott of their Hindu neighbours, only to discover that when the balance of

pressure changed, their interests were the first to be sacrificed. The lesson drawn by the Muslim press was brutally clear - Britain respected agitation, not loyalty; the Hindus had won by six years of organised defiance what the Muslims had been denied for six years of organised loyalty. That conclusion, once drawn, could not be un-drawn and it transformed the assumptions on which Muslim politics rested.

Reappraisal of the Policy of Loyalty

Since the days of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the dominant strategy of Muslim politics had been loyal cooperation with the British in return for safeguards, educational advance and a fair share of power; political agitation on the Congress model had been deliberately avoided. The annulment discredited this strategy in the eyes of a whole younger generation. Leaders such as Maulana Muhammad Ali, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad - whose journal Al-Hilal, launched in 1912, preached a new, assertive Muslim politics - and Zafar Ali Khan of the Zamindar argued that Muslims must rely upon their own organisation and strength rather than upon British promises. The older loyalist leadership lost authority, and with it the Aga Khan resigned the permanent presidentship of the Muslim League in 1913 amid disagreement over the League's new direction. Loyalty was not abandoned overnight - the League remained constitutionalist - but it was now conditional and distrustful: safeguards would henceforth have to be written into constitutions and won by bargaining, not expected as favours.

Political Consequences: A Turning Point in Muslim Politics

The constructive result of the shock was a rapid reorientation of Muslim politics. In 1913 the All-India Muslim League amended its constitution and adopted, alongside the protection of

Muslim rights, the attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India as one of its aims - a decisive move towards the nationalist mainstream that would have been unthinkable before 1911. In the same year Muhammad Ali Jinnah, already a member of Congress and of the Imperial Legislative Council, joined the Muslim League, bringing with him the ambition of a Hindu-Muslim settlement. The logic of the new situation was soon visible: if the British could no longer be trusted as protectors, Muslims needed both their own strong organisation and, if possible, an agreed settlement with Congress from a position of strength. The fruit of this rethinking was the Lucknow Pact of 1916, in which Congress accepted separate electorates for Muslims and the two organisations presented a joint scheme of reforms - the high point of Jinnah's career as the 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity'.

The annulment also changed how Muslims evaluated every later British offer. The distrust sown in 1911 explains why the Muslim League insisted, in the 1920s and 1930s, on statutory guarantees - separate electorates, weightage, provincial autonomy and residuary powers - rather than conventions and assurances, and why the rejection of those demands in the Nehru Report of 1928 produced so complete a rupture. In Bengal itself, the reunited province restored Hindu political predominance, Muslim grievances over education and services persisted, and the memory of a Muslim-majority province lost in 1911 kept alive the idea of a territorial solution in the east that reappeared in the Lahore Resolution's demand for an independent state in the eastern zone. Historians therefore rank the annulment with the partition itself as one of the decisive formative experiences of Muslim separatism.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Muslims reacted to the annulment of the partition of Bengal first with disbelief, grief and a profound sense of betrayal, because a settlement they had been assured was final had been reversed under the pressure of Hindu agitation without their being consulted. Their deeper reaction was strategic: the policy of unquestioning loyalty to the British stood discredited, a younger and more assertive leadership came forward, and the Muslim League reoriented itself in 1913 towards self-government, self-reliance and negotiated safeguards, producing the Lucknow Pact within five years. The annulment thus taught Indian Muslims the central lesson of their modern politics - that rights in India would belong to those organised strongly enough to defend them - and in that sense 1911 prepared the road to 1940 and to Pakistan.

USMAN NOTES www.usmannotes.com

Question 4: Nature and Purpose of the Khilafat Movement (20 Marks)

Discuss the nature and purpose of the Khilafat Movement.

Introduction

The Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) was the great mass agitation launched by the Muslims of India to protect the Ottoman Caliphate after the defeat of Turkey in the First World War. Led by the Ali Brothers - Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Maulana Shaukat Ali - together with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr M. A. Ansari and the ulema, and supported for a time by Mahatma Gandhi, who linked it with his Non-Cooperation Movement, it drew millions of ordinary Muslims into politics for the first time and produced the closest Hindu-

Muslim cooperation of the entire freedom struggle. To discuss its nature and purpose, we must examine the religious sentiment that inspired it, the political form it took, the objectives its leaders announced, the course it ran, and the reasons for its sudden collapse when Turkey itself abolished the Caliphate in 1924.

Background: Why the Caliph Mattered to Indian Muslims

For Indian Muslims the Ottoman Sultan was not a foreign ruler but the Khalifa - the temporal head of the worldwide Muslim community and the custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and of Jerusalem. This attachment was religious, emotional and political at once, and it had grown stronger during the Balkan Wars and the Italo-Turkish war, when Indian Muslims had sent funds and a medical mission to Turkey. In 1914 Turkey entered the war against Britain, placing Indian Muslims in an agonising position; they nevertheless served the Empire after assurances such as Lloyd George's declaration of January 1918 that the Allies were not fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the lands of Asia Minor and Thrace. The Armistice of Mudros (October 1918), the Allied occupation of Constantinople, the Greek landing at Smyrna and finally the Treaty of Sevres (August 1920), which dismembered the Ottoman Empire, were therefore read in India as a deliberate betrayal of solemn pledges and an assault upon Islam itself. The Khilafat Movement was the protest of a community that believed both its faith and British honour were at stake.

Nature of the Movement

In nature the Khilafat Movement was a religious-political mass movement, and each of those three words matters. It was religious in its inspiration and vocabulary: the cause was the

preservation of an Islamic institution, its meetings opened with Quranic recitation, its propaganda was carried by ulema and mosque networks, fatwas pronounced India under an unrepentant Britain to be dar-ul-harb (a land of war), and thousands, in the Hijrat exodus of 1920, sold their property and migrated towards Afghanistan rather than live under a power that had wronged Islam. It was political in its organisation and methods: a Central Khilafat Committee was formed at Bombay in March 1919, Khilafat conferences were held at Delhi, Lucknow, Calcutta and Madras, a delegation under Muhammad Ali carried the Indian case to London in 1920, and the movement adopted the modern techniques of hartals, resolutions, fundraising (the Khilafat fund) and boycott. And it was a mass movement: students left government institutions, women - most famously Bi Amman, the mother of the Ali Brothers - addressed public meetings, and peasants and townsmen who had never attended a political gathering joined Khilafat committees in districts across India.

Two further features define its nature. First, it was an alliance movement: Gandhi recognised in the Khilafat grievance an opportunity to unite Hindus and Muslims, describing it as a cause in which Hindu support was a religious duty of friendship, and in return the Khilafat leadership accepted his programme of non-cooperation for the attainment of swaraj; the Congress adopted non-cooperation at its Calcutta special session of September 1920 and confirmed it at Nagpur in December 1920, so that for two years Khilafat and Congress agitated together. Secondly, it was predominantly non-violent and constitutional-mass in form, following Gandhi's discipline of boycotting foreign cloth, government schools, courts and titles, though it had violent fringes: the Moplah rising in Malabar in 1921 turned a Khilafat agitation into a bloody communal outbreak, and the Hijrat ended in misery for the migrants. Leaders such as Jinnah

warned at Nagpur against mixing religious fanaticism with politics and opposed non-cooperation, resigning from Congress in 1920 - a warning that shows the movement's nature was debated even by its sympathisers. The Muslim League, as a party, was temporarily eclipsed, for the Khilafat Committee, not the League, now spoke for politically aroused Muslims.

Purpose and Objectives of the Movement

The purposes of the movement, as stated in its resolutions and manifestos, were the following.

- To preserve the Khilafat of the Ottoman Sultan with its temporal power and prestige intact, so that the Caliph remained an effective head of the Muslim world and not a British pensioner or puppet.
- To protect the Jazirat-ul-Arab - Arabia including Mecca, Medina and the other holy places, together with Jerusalem - from non-Muslim control, and to secure the Caliph's custodianship over them.
- To compel Britain to honour its wartime pledges and revise the Treaty of Sevres, restoring to Turkey the territories of Thrace, Smyrna and Constantinople and cancelling the Allied occupation and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.
- To express and organise the pan-Islamic solidarity of Indian Muslims with their co-religionists abroad, and to assert that Indian Muslims, though subjects of the British Empire, possessed a distinct political personality whose religious obligations the Empire must respect.

- Within India, to use the combined Hindu-Muslim agitation to obtain swaraj: Gandhi explicitly linked the Khilafat wrong, the Punjab wrong (Jallianwala Bagh and martial law) and the demand for self-government as the three objects of non-cooperation, so that for the Indian leadership the movement also became an instrument of national liberation.
- To awaken and organise the Muslim masses politically – to take them out of the loyalist quietism that had prevailed since 1857 and train them in agitation, organisation and sacrifice, an object in which the movement succeeded beyond all expectation.

Course and End of the Movement

The movement passed quickly through its stages. Khilafat Day was observed on 17 October 1919; the failed London delegation and the publication of the Sevres terms in 1920 pushed it towards non-cooperation, formally adopted by the Central Khilafat Committee and then by Congress during 1920. Through 1921 the joint agitation reached its height: foreign cloth was burnt, national schools and colleges such as the Jamia Millia Islamia were founded, titles were surrendered, the visit of the Prince of Wales in November 1921 was boycotted, and the Ali Brothers were arrested for sedition. Then the structure cracked. The Moplah violence stained its non-violent claim; in February 1922, after the Chauri Chaura incident in which a mob killed twenty-two policemen, Gandhi unilaterally suspended non-cooperation, leaving Khilafat workers demoralised and many feeling betrayed. Meanwhile events in Turkey removed the movement's object altogether: Mustafa Kemal's nationalists defeated the Greeks, obtained the far better Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, abolished the Sultanate in November 1922, and on 3 March 1924 abolished the Caliphate itself and exiled the last Caliph, Abdul Mejid II. A

movement to save the Caliphate could not survive the Caliphate's abolition by the Turks themselves, and by 1924 the Khilafat organisation had dissolved.

Effects and Significance

Although it failed in its stated object, the Khilafat Movement permanently changed Indian politics. It achieved the most complete Hindu-Muslim unity of the century, demonstrating the power of a joint mass struggle; it politicised the Muslim masses and produced a generation of activists; and it brought religion openly into mass politics, with consequences - both mobilising and, after 1922, embittering - that included a wave of communal riots in the mid-1920s when the alliance collapsed. It also weakened loyalist politics, overshadowed the Muslim League, and taught Muslim leaders lessons in mass organisation that the League would later apply, in very different circumstances, to the Pakistan movement.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Khilafat Movement was in nature a religious-political mass movement - religious in cause and sentiment, modern and organised in method, and nationalist in its Indian alliance - whose purposes were to save the Ottoman Caliphate and the holy places, to force Britain to honour its pledges and revise the peace with Turkey, and, in India, to forge Hindu-Muslim unity for swaraj. It failed because its object lay outside India and was destroyed by the Turks themselves in 1924, and because its Indian alliance broke after Chauri Chaura; but as the first all-India mobilisation of the Muslim masses, it remains a central episode in the genesis of modern Muslim politics in the subcontinent.

Question 5: The Nehru Report and Muslim Interests (20 Marks)

How did the Nehru Report respond to the Muslim interests? Discuss.

Introduction

The Nehru Report of August 1928 was the first serious attempt by Indians to draft a constitution for a self-governing India. It arose from the boycott of the all-white Simon Commission and from the challenge thrown out by the Secretary of State, Lord Birkenhead, that Indians were incapable of agreeing upon a constitution among themselves. An All Parties Conference appointed a committee under Motilal Nehru (with Jawaharlal Nehru as secretary and members including Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Ali Imam and Subhas Chandra Bose), whose report proposed dominion status, a parliamentary federation and a bill of rights. For the Muslims, however, everything depended on how the report treated the safeguards they had demanded since 1906 - separate electorates, an assured share of power at the centre, and autonomous Muslim-majority provinces. On almost every one of these questions the report answered against the Muslim position, and its rejection of the Muslim demands produced the final parting of the ways between Jinnah and Congress and led directly to the Fourteen Points of 1929.

The Muslim Demands on the Table

To judge the report's response, the Muslim position of 1927-1928 must first be stated. In the Delhi Muslim Proposals of March 1927, Jinnah and his colleagues had made a remarkable offer: Muslims would surrender separate electorates - their most cherished safeguard since 1909 - and accept joint electorates, provided four conditions were met: (1) Sindh should be separated

from Bombay and made a full province; (2) reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan on the same footing as in other provinces; (3) in the Punjab and Bengal, representation should be in proportion to population, which protected the Muslim majorities there; and (4) Muslims should have one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature. Behind these four points lay two deeper principles on which virtually all Muslim schools of thought agreed: that India should be a federation in which residuary powers lay with the provinces (so that Muslim-majority provinces would be genuinely autonomous), and that Muslims, as a permanent minority in an all-India electorate, required guaranteed representation rather than dependence on majority goodwill. These were the interests to which the Nehru Report had to respond.

Main Recommendations of the Nehru Report

The report recommended dominion status within the British Empire as India's immediate goal; a bicameral central legislature elected on adult franchise; a parliamentary executive responsible to the legislature; a federation in name but with a strong centre, to which residuary powers were assigned; the redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis; nineteen fundamental rights; and a Supreme Court. Sindh's separation from Bombay was accepted only in principle and made conditional upon financial self-sufficiency and upon the establishment of dominion status, and the Frontier and Balochistan reforms were not conceded on the footing Muslims had demanded. On the communal question - the heart of the matter - the report recommended joint electorates throughout India, rejected separate electorates as a 'poison', and allowed reservation of seats for Muslims only in those provinces where they were in a minority, strictly in proportion to population. In the Punjab and Bengal, where Muslims were

the majority, no reservation was allowed at all; and the demand for one-third Muslim representation in the Central Legislature was refused.

How the Report Responded to Muslim Interests: A Detailed Appraisal

Measured against the Delhi Proposals and the wider Muslim position, the report conceded remarkably little, as the following comparison shows.

Table 1: Muslim demands and the response of the Nehru Report, 1928

Muslim demand	Response of the Nehru Report
Separate electorates (or joint electorates only on the Delhi conditions)	Rejected: joint electorates imposed; separate electorates condemned and abolished
One-third of seats in the Central Legislature	Rejected: no guaranteed share at the centre
Residuary powers with the provinces; a genuinely federal structure	Reversed: strong centre with residuary powers at the centre
Representation by population in Punjab and Bengal, with safeguards	Population basis in principle, but all reservation in the two Muslim-majority provinces refused
Immediate separation of Sindh; full reforms in NWFP and Balochistan	Sindh separation made conditional and deferred; Frontier/Balochistan demands not met in full

Three aspects of this response deserve emphasis. First, the report removed the Muslims' existing safeguard - separate electorates, enjoyed since 1909 - without providing the compensating guarantees for which Jinnah had offered to surrender it. Muslims were asked to trust joint electorates in which, outside their two majority provinces, they would be a permanent minority dependent on Hindu votes, while even in the Punjab and Bengal joint electorates without reservation threatened to dilute their demographic majority through the greater wealth, education and organisational strength of their opponents. Secondly, the constitutional structure was the opposite of what Muslims required: a strong centre holding

residuary powers meant permanent rule by the all-India majority over the very provinces where Muslims were concentrated, whereas a loose federation with autonomous provinces was the one arrangement under which Muslims could govern themselves somewhere. Thirdly, the tone of the report treated the communal problem as an artificial British creation that would dissolve in a free India, whereas Muslim leaders regarded their fears as structural facts of demography. The report therefore responded to Muslim interests not by accommodating them but by asking Muslims to abandon them.

It is fair to record what the report did offer: reservation for Muslims in minority provinces (something Congress had not always conceded), full fundamental rights including religious freedom, adult franchise (which would enfranchise the Muslim masses of Bengal and Punjab), linguistic provinces, and acceptance in principle of Sindh's separation. Jinnah himself initially treated the report as a basis for negotiation, not as a final enemy. But these offers did not touch the core Muslim anxieties - representation at the centre, provincial autonomy and an electorally secure position in their majority provinces - and the Hindu Mahasabha's pressure against even these concessions, voiced by leaders such as M. R. Jayakar, convinced Muslims that Congress could not deliver more even if it wished.

Muslim Reaction: Calcutta 1928 and the Fourteen Points

The decisive moment came at the All Parties Convention at Calcutta in December 1928, where Jinnah moved modest amendments designed to save the settlement: one-third Muslim representation in the Central Legislature, residuary powers for the provinces, and reservation of seats for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal until adult franchise was fully operative. The

amendments were rejected, largely under Mahasabha opposition. Jinnah left Calcutta declaring, in his famous phrase, 'this is the parting of the ways', and announcing that no constitutional settlement was possible on such terms. Muslim opinion, which had been divided between the Jinnah and Shafi wings of the League, now consolidated: at Delhi in March 1929 Jinnah presented his Fourteen Points, which became the charter of Muslim demands for a decade. They insisted on a federal constitution with residuary powers in the provinces, uniform provincial autonomy, adequate Muslim representation in every legislature and elected body, separate electorates until communities chose otherwise, one-third of the central legislature and of cabinets, protection of Muslim religion, culture, language and personal law, the separation of Sindh, full reforms in NWFP and Balochistan, and a guarantee that no constitution could be amended without the consent of the federating units. Every point of the Fourteen is a direct reply to a refusal of the Nehru Report.

Significance

The Nehru Report's failure on the Muslim question had long consequences. It destroyed the last realistic chance of an agreed Congress-League constitutional settlement in the 1920s; it convinced Jinnah, the most nationalist of Muslim leaders, that Congress - under pressure from its own Hindu right wing - would never concede Muslim safeguards within a united India; and it fixed the agenda of the 1930s, in which Muslims bargained at the Round Table Conferences on the basis of the Fourteen Points rather than the Delhi Proposals. When those bargains also failed, the logic that began at Calcutta in 1928 led, by way of Iqbal's Allahabad address of 1930, to the demand for separate Muslim statehood. The report remains a landmark of Indian

constitution-making; but as an answer to Muslim interests it asked the minority to surrender its safeguards in exchange for trust, and the minority declined.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Nehru Report responded to Muslim interests largely by rejecting them: it abolished separate electorates without accepting the Delhi conditions, refused one-third representation at the centre, refused reservation in the Punjab and Bengal, deferred Sindh, and built a strong-centred federation where Muslims needed autonomous provinces. Its concessions - minority-province reservation, fundamental rights and adult franchise - were real but peripheral to Muslim fears. Jinnah's rejected amendments at Calcutta and his Fourteen Points of 1929 were the direct Muslim reply, and the rupture of 1928 marks the point after which a Congress-League settlement of the communal problem ceased to be attainable.

USMAN NOTES www.usmannotes.com